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Mapping Variation of Civil Society Involvement
in EU Trade Agreements: A CSI Index*
Deborah MARTENS**, Lore VAN DEN PUTTE**, Myriam OEHRI** & Jan ORBIE**
Civil society has apparently been granted an important role in the monitoring of the
sustainable development chapters in the new generation European Union (EU) trade agree-
ments. While a debate about the role and functioning of these civil society mechanisms is
emerging, we lack a profound comparative analysis of the treaty provisions establishing them.
In order to address this gap and to map the extent to which civil society is included in the
agreements, a Civil Society Involvement (CSI) Index is developed inductively and applied to
the ten relevant EU trade agreements. It concludes that although some form of template is
used, large variation exists. A distinction is made between three categories of CSI score: high
(Canada, Korea), medium (Georgia, Moldova, Vietnam, Ukraine), and low (Central
America, Singapore, Peru-Colombia, Ecuador). The outcome also reveals interesting nuances
within these categories and calls for further research on the rationale for and consequences of this
variation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Civil society organizations have, apparently, been granted an important role in the
discussion and monitoring of the sustainable development chapters1 in the new
generation of European Union (EU) trade agreements.2 Although civil society was
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1 While the formal name of these chapters is the ‘chapter on trade and sustainable development’, we
refer to them as the ‘sustainable development chapter’ to ensure reader-friendliness.
2 Our definition of ‘civil society’ follows the practice of the EU, referring to a wide range of non-state
actors including most importantly labour, environmental and business groups, but also organizations
working on human rights, animal rights, and consumer interests, for instance. P. Bouwen, Business
Interest Representation and Legitimate European Governance, in Civil Society and Legitimate European
mentioned in previous trade agreements,3 it is only since the EU-Korea agreement
that civil society mechanisms have become a standard and quite prominent feature
of EU trade agreements. While the US and Canada include civil society to some
extent in their agreements,4 the EU has opted for a more specific and elaborate
approach towards civil society involvement (CSI). These mechanisms arguably
reflect the distinctive, cooperative approach of the EU, which emphasizes dialogue
and collaboration over sanction-based enforcement.5 The approach also reflects the
EU’s ambition to involve civil society more in its internal6 and external7 policy-
making and implementation.
A debate about the role and functioning of the civil society mechanisms
created in the context of EU trade agreements is emerging.8 While the number
of such mechanisms has grown exponentially in recent years, alongside the
increasing number of EU trade agreements entering into force, there are no
systematic and comparative analyses of these mechanisms as yet. The limited
number of evaluations of the functioning of the meetings that have taken place so
far are mainly policy-oriented and their assessments diverge from a negative
‘talking shop’ to a positive ‘empowerment opportunity’.9 Indeed, we lack a
profound analysis of the treaty provisions on these civil society mechanisms,
hampering a sound evaluation.
Governance (S. Smismans ed., Edward Elgar 2006); European Commission, The Roots of Democracy and
Sustainable Development: Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations (2012).
3 The EU trade agreements with Mexico (1997), South Africa (2000), and Chile (2002) mention a
vague possibility or desirability to consult civil society organizations.
4 US and Canadian trade agreements foresee the possibility for any person with an interest, in practice
often civil society organizations, to file a complaint if one of the Parties to the trade agreement is not
respecting its labour commitments. Both the US and Canada also established a permanent advisory
system to involve civil society in the implementation of the trade agreement. ILO, Assessment of Labour
Provisions in Trade and Investment Arrangements (ILO 2016).
5 M. Oehri, Comparing US and EU Labour Governance ‘Near and Far’: Hierarchy vs Network?, 22 J. Eur.
Pub. Pol’y (2015); E. Postnikov & I. Bastiaens, Does Dialogue Work? The Effectiveness of Labor Standards
in EU Preferential Trade Agreements, 21 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y (2014); ILO, supra n. 4.
6 European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper (2001); K. Armstrong, Rediscovering Civil
Society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance, 8 Eur. L.J. (2002).
7 European Commission, supra n. 2.
8 J. Orbie, D. Martens & L. Van den Putte, Civil Society Meetings in European Union Trade Agreements:
Features, Purposes, and Evaluation (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations 2016).
9 EESC, Civil Society in Action – Monitoring Sustainable Development and Wider FTA Implementation:
Lessons to Be Drawn From the EU Experience, in Summary Report: EESC Session at Public Forum WTO
2012 (C. Miglioli ed., 2012); EESC, Briefing Note to the Attention of Mr. Dumitru Fornea for Trade Policy
Committee Dinner Organized by the Dutch EU Presidency, Discussion about the Trade and Sustainable
Development Chapters in EU Trade Agreements, including Civil Society Monitoring Mechanisms (2016);
EESC, EESC Evaluation of Civil Society Advisory Mechanisms in EU Free Trade Agreements (2016); D.
Martens, et al., Civil Society Meetings in EU Trade Agreements: Recommendations and Lessons for EPAs
(ECDPM 2016); Y. Altintzis, Civil Society Engagement and Linkages in EU Trade Policy, in Linking Trade
and Non-Commercial Interests: The EU as a Global Role Model? (T. Takacs & A. Dimopoulos eds, Centre
for the Law of EU External Relations 2013).
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As Postnikov and Bastiaens but also Lechner highlight, knowledge on the
design of the social provisions in trade agreements is key to understanding the
implementation and ultimate success of these provisions.10 In fact, during the civil
society meetings observed by the authors, the legal texts were used as a source to
discuss the mandate and set-up of the mechanisms and were referred to on several
occasions.11 We therefore expect the provisions on CSI to affect the practical
functioning and effectiveness of the mechanisms so a systematic and comparative
analysis seems indispensable. Only then will we be able to assess whether civil
society has been granted an important role in discussing and monitoring the
sustainable development chapters of recent EU trade agreements.
This comparative mapping is all the more relevant since there is uncertainty
about the extent to which civil society provisions actually differ across agreements.
On the one hand, there seems to be a common template with several key features
(see infra). In this context, the sustainable development chapter in the EU-Korea
agreement is often considered to be a ‘blueprint’ or ‘gold standard’ for the
subsequent agreements.12,13 From an institutionalist theoretical perspective and
according to existing research on EU external democracy promotion, EU nego-
tiators follow specific templates that are based on domestic institutional
prerequisites.14 If it is true that the civil society meetings are ‘toothless’ and merely
a ‘talking shop’, one can also expect that these ‘declaratory’ provisions do not
require thorough negotiations and therefore the same provisions would reappear in
every subsequent agreement. On the other hand, existing studies on EU external
10 L. Lechner, The Domestic Battle over the Design of Non-Trade Issues in Preferential Trade Agreements, 23
Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. (2016); Postnikov & Bastiaens, supra n. 5.
11 The authors attended the following civil society meetings: the transnational public meeting of the
EU-Peru-Colombia agreement (Dec. 2016), the transnational meeting of the EU-Central America
agreement (June 2016 and May 2015), the EU domestic mechanism of the EU-Peru-Colombia
agreement (Apr. 2016), a transnational meeting of the EU-CARIFORUM agreement (Apr. 2016),
the EU domestic mechanism of the EU-Central America Association Agreement (Mar. 2016) and a
meeting of the EU Delegation in Colombia with local civil society (Dec. 2015).
12 This is the main reason why we do not examine the EU-CARIFORUM agreement (2007). This
agreement constitutes an Economic Partnership Agreement implementing the trade provisions of the
Cotonou Agreement (2000). Therefore this agreement does not fall within the ‘new generation’ of EU
trade agreements. Specifically, it does not have a separate chapter on sustainable development and it
does not establish domestic civil society meetings (only a transnational meeting), which makes it
difficult to compare with the 10 agreements since Korea.
13 Personal interview, DG Trade, (Aug. 2016); F. Bossuyt, The Social Dimension of the New Generation of
EU FTAs with Asia and Latin America: Ambitious Continuation for the Sake of Policy Coherence, 14 Eur.
Foreign Aff. Rev. Special Issue, 703–722 (2009); F. Hoffmeister, The Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreements of the European Union – Concept and Challenges, in Trade Liberalisation and
Standardisation – New Directions in the ‘Low Politics’ of EU Foreign Policy (M. Cremona & T. Takács
eds, Centre for the Law of EU External Relations 2013).
14 See F. Bicchi, ‘Our Size Fits All’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean’, 13 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y
(2006); T. Börzel & T. Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy
and the Rule of Law, Workshop on Democracy Promotion (2004).
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relations found that there may be variations within the same template.15 Also when
it comes to CSI in the sustainable development chapter, Bartels alluded to differ-
ences across EU agreements.16
Accordingly, a new comparative study is timely for at least three reasons. First,
since Bartels’ study many more agreements containing civil society provisions have
been concluded and consequently one can expect even more variation. Second,
interviews and existing studies found that the sustainable development chapters of
at least some agreements involved tough negotiations between the EU and third
countries, thereby disqualifying the suggestion that they would be irrelevant and
unvarying.17 Third, growing contestation, especially since the negotiations with
the US and Canada, has been questioning the legitimacy of the EU trade agree-
ments. Ambitious CSI provisions can be a way to address current criticisms.18
We therefore take up the challenge of creating a more nuanced and accurate
picture of the design of CSI. In essence, we will provide a comprehensive over-
view of the variation in civil society provisions that exists between the different
agreements. Our main objective is to thoroughly map the extent to which civil
society is included in the sustainable development chapter of EU trade agreements.
For this purpose we develop a CSI Index based on five clusters and twenty-one
criteria and apply this to the ten ‘new generation’ trade agreements19 signed by the
EU. In doing so, we provide an innovative analytical tool that contributes to
existing databases mapping the design of trade agreements, such as the Design of
Trade Agreements (DESTA) database, which does not consider CSI as a separate
15 A. Wetzel & J. Orbie, The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases (Palgrave 2015).
16 L. Bartels, Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements, 40 Legal
Issues Econ. Integration (2013).
17 Personal interview, supra n. 13; personal interview, Secretary of Economic Development Honduras
(June 2016); personal interview, EESC (Nov. 2016); ICAES & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Guía
didáctica de formación: Las Rondas de Negociación sobre un Acuerdo de Asociación U.E. – C.A. (2013).
18 More critically, increasing EU trade agreement’s legitimacy through CSI can also be interpreted as co-
optation of civil society. See J. Orbie, D. Martens, M. Oehri & L. Van den Putte, Promoting Sustainable
Development or Legitimising Free Trade? Civil Society Mechanisms in EU Trade Agreements, Third World
Thematics (2017).
19 EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (negotiations concluded in 2009), EU-Peru-Colombia Trade
Agreement (2010), EU-Central America Association Agreement (2010), EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement (2011), EU-Moldova Association Agreement (2013), EU-Georgia Association
Agreement (2013), EU-Peru-Colombia-Ecuador Trade Agreement (2014)*, EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (2014), EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
(2014), EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (2016). For the sake of simplicity we will refer to these
preferential trade agreements uniformly as ‘trade agreements’.
*In this analysis the accession of Ecuador to the EU trade agreement with Colombia and Peru is
treated separately because the provisions establishing the civil society mechanisms could – in theory –
have been renegotiated. Art. 329 on accession by other Andean countries states that the EU ‘shall aim
at preserving the integrity of this Agreement’, suggesting that ‘flexibility’ should be limited to
concessions on market and investment related issues in the annexes, ‘and any aspect for which such
flexibility were necessary for the accession’. The question what is ‘necessary’ is of course a political
one.
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category in its codebook, and the TRade & ENvironment Database (TREND),
which maps environmental provisions in trade agreements, including public invol-
vement in the implementation of the agreements.20
Methodologically, this article applies an inductive approach, starting from the
empirical observations in the different EU agreements. Throughout this process, a
codebook was developed, resulting in an overall CSI Index, allowing us to
comparatively assess the agreements. From this, several provisional conclusions
and findings concerning the involvement of civil society in the monitoring of
EU trade agreements will emerge that can be used for further, theory-testing
research.
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, the CSI Index will
be developed in the section 2. A section 3 will then apply this CSI Index system-
atically to map the civil society provisions in the new EU trade agreements. This
will reveal a surprising amount of variation between the agreements which will
then be analysed. The conclusions will outline the main findings and suggest
avenues for further research.
2 DOWN TO THE LAST DETAIL: THE CSI INDEX
Overall, three recurrent features characterize all the CSI in the sustainable develop-
ment chapter of EU trade agreements. First, they refer to a domestic group (mostly
called ‘domestic advisory group’) in which representatives of three constituencies
(labour, environment, and business) of each signatory Party (both within the EU and
within its trading partner(s)) participate. Second, they establish a transnational
mechanism where the members of the domestic mechanism and/or other civil
society organizations of both the EU and its trading partner(s) meet annually.
Third, they foresee some interaction between these two mechanisms and the inter-
governmental body (between the EU and its trading partner(s), the so-called Parties)
that meets annually in relation to the implementation of the sustainable development
chapter. However as will be illustrated throughout the article, within this common
template, there is significant diversity between different EU trade agreements. The
CSI Index spelled out below was developed in order to identify and map all these
differences. For this purpose, we elaborated several clusters and criteria of CSI,
resulting in an overall CSI Index that provides a general indication of the extent to
which civil society is involved in a particular EU trade agreement.
The codebook and the scores for the different criteria were developed in an
inductive way. The criteria and their scores were informed by the authors’ earlier
20 See at: http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/, and http://www.chaire-epi.ulaval.ca/trend
(accessed Nov. 2016).
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research based on document analysis, interviews, field research, and participant
observation.21 The development of the codebook and the attribution of the scores
were fine-tuned through a ‘double blind’ approach that proceeded in five phases in
order to increase the intercoder reliability. First, two researchers independent from
each other constructed a codebook deriving general clusters and specific criteria
from the CSI provisions in all recent EU trade agreements. Second, both research-
ers shared their codebook with each other in order to agree on the clusters, specific
criteria, and operationalization of the different codes. In the third phase the
researchers applied the aggregated codebook to the provisions of the agreements.
Fourth, the results were once again compared and final decisions on the codes and
operationalization were made. Finally, the criteria and results were shared with
policymakers working on the topic who largely subscribed to this coding as well as
to its results.
This exercise resulted in twenty-one criteria which are categorized into five
clusters (see Annex for the codebook). These clusters concern (1) the participants’
independence from the Parties, (2) the scope of membership, (3) the operation of
the transnational meetings, (4) the interaction among civil society and interaction
with the government(s), and (5) the involvement in the dispute settlement
mechanism. By engaging in this coding exercise described above, the criteria are
able to cover all relevant variation existing in the agreements since the EU-Korea
agreement.22 Each of the criteria is scored according to the authors’ assessments of
their CSI.23 The subsequent paragraphs set out the five clusters and their (sub)
criteria in general terms. A more detailed overview can be found in the codebook
in the Annex.
2.1 INDEPENDENCE OF PARTICIPANTS
The first cluster concerns the independence of participants from the Parties taking
part in the civil society mechanisms. First, there is variation regarding the explicit
terms used to indicate the concept of ‘civil society’. In the EU-Singapore (Article
13.15.4) and EU-Vietnam agreement (Article 15.4) the term ‘stakeholders’ is
employed, while the term ‘civil society’ is used for all other agreements. This is
relevant because even though this word choice stems from cultural preferences, it
may have significant implications for the kind of organizations that participate in
21 List of observed meetings, supra n. 11.
22 The codebook might need to be updated if current negotiations, such as the EU-Japan agreement or
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States, lead to novelties.
23 The scores provided in Table 1 merely reflect variation in the involvement of civil society and are not
intended to be interpreted as if a score of 18 (EU-Ukraine) would mean that CSI is twice as much as a
score of 9 (EU-Peru-Colombia).
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the mechanisms and the links they have with the state.24 Second, independence of
civil society determines whether the autonomy of participating civil society is
explicitly mentioned. This is the case in all agreements except for the EU-Peru-
Colombia and EU-Ecuador agreements. Third, selection reflects the way civil
society representatives will be designated. Specifically, there is variation in whether
the composition and consultation of the domestic mechanisms should be in
accordance with domestic law. Such a provision gives a considerable amount of
leeway to the governments to organize the mechanism according to their own
preferences, as is the case for the EU-Vietnam (Article 15.4) and EU-Peru-
Colombia agreements (Article 281). In this cluster, CSI will be rated higher
when the meetings are more independent from the Parties.
2.2 SCOPE OF MEMBERSHIP
The second cluster concerns the scope of membership which is characterized by
great diversity. Four criteria were discerned. A first criterion refers to the specificity
of membership of the domestic mechanism. While some agreements such as the EU-
Korea, EU-Peru-Colombia, and EU-Ukraine agreements only vaguely mention
the groups that can participate, others are much more specific. For instance, the
EU-Canada agreement mentions that the domestic labour mechanism involves
‘employers, unions, labour and business organizations, as well as other relevant
stakeholders as appropriate’ (Article 23.8.4). The CSI is higher when the member-
ship of a group is more concretely described, as it reflects a more specific commit-
ment to include certain groups. A second criterion, novelty, concerns the need to
establish a new domestic mechanism. In most cases the use of existing mechanisms
is allowed. The EU-Central America agreement enables the employment of
existing mechanisms but points out that the Parties ‘shall offer existing bodies the
opportunity to reinforce and develop their activities with the new perspectives and
areas of work provided by this Title’ (Article 294.4 footnote 45). Only the EU-
Korea agreement obliges the governments to set up a new mechanism to deal with
sustainable development (Article 13.12.4). CSI will be higher in this case because
there is a separate mechanism that is specifically mandated to deal with the
sustainable development dimension of the trade agreement. When existing
mechanisms can be used, there is less certainty that these will discuss or monitor
the trade agreement, let alone the sustainable development chapter. A third
24 Personal interview, supra n. 13; H. Volkhart, Studying Civil Society Across the World: Exploring the
Thorny Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement, 1 J. Civil Soc’y (2005); C. Spurk, Understanding Civil
Society, in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment (T. Paffenholz ed., Lynne Rienner
Publishers 2010).
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criterion indicates the specificity of membership of the transnational mechanism. In the
EU-Vietnam agreement, for example, it is mentioned that members of the domes-
tic mechanisms meet in the transnational meeting (Article 15.5), while the EU
agreement with Peru-Colombia and Ecuador only foresee a session with civil
society organizations and the public at large (Article 281.1). CSI is scored higher
when the participants in the transnational mechanisms include the members of the
domestic mechanisms together with other additional groups than when the public
at large can meet without any continuity in membership whatsoever. A final
criterion concerns the potential presence of state actors. The possibility for ‘local public
authorities’ to take part in the civil society mechanisms is only explicitly mentioned
in the case of the EU-Central America agreement (Article 294.5). As their pre-
sence could potentially limit the possibility to speak out freely and may strengthen
the governmental interference in the ‘selection’ (see criteria supra), CSI is rated
higher when their presence is not explicitly permitted.
2.3 OPERATION OF TRANSNATIONAL MECHANISM
A third cluster concerns the operation of transnational meetings and consists of
three criteria. The first criterion refers to the deadline for the Parties to agree on the
operation of the transnational mechanism. While in most agreements it is specified
that the Parties should determine the operation within one year after the entry into
force of the agreement, this is not explicitly stated in the cases of the EU-Central
America, EU-Singapore, and EU-Canada agreements. As we expect such a dead-
line to ensure that the transnational mechanism is on the agenda of the Parties and
their intergovernmental body and will therefore take place in time, we provide a
higher CSI score for it. The second criterion relates to the reoccurrence of the
transnational meetings. In the EU-Singapore agreement the transnational meetings
are to take place within the first two years after the entry into force of the
agreement and thereafter ‘as necessary’ (Article 13.15.3), whereas all other agree-
ments mention that this mechanism shall meet once a year. We expect CSI to be
higher when they are to meet frequently. A third criterion concerns the dependence
of the transnational meeting on the intergovernmental body to be convened or organized
(sometimes in conjunction with the Parties’ own meetings). For example in the
case of the EU-Central America agreement ‘the Parties agree to organize and
facilitate a bi-regional Civil Society Dialogue Forum for open dialogue’ (Article
295.1). Only in the case of the EU-Korea and EU-Ukraine agreements does the
organization of the transnational meeting not depend formally on the Parties. We
give CSI a higher score in these cases, as it provides more possibilities for the
transnational mechanism to determine its own meeting frequency.
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While the first three clusters refer to the establishment and functioning of the
civil society mechanisms, the last two clusters concern the relationship of these
mechanisms with other bodies or processes created in the context of the sustainable
development chapters. The latter clusters mirror the interaction between the civil
society mechanisms, their relationship to the governments, and their involvement
in the dispute settlement procedure.
2.4 INTERACTION
A fourth cluster concerns interaction, both among civil society mechanisms and
between them and the Parties. The first criterion reflects the interaction among civil
society mechanisms. In the cases of the EU-Korea, EU-Ukraine, and EU-Canada
agreements, the possibility for direct interaction between the transnational and the
domestic mechanism is created. In our codebook, CSI is rated higher when it is
explicitly mentioned that both mechanisms can communicate as it creates a formal
communication channel between them.
A second criterion covers the interaction between civil society and the Parties. Four
subcriteria are identified to describe the variation in the interaction. The first
subcriterion concerns interaction between the domestic mechanism and the Parties.
The EU-Moldova agreement, for example, mentions that the domestic mechan-
isms may submit views or recommendations to the Parties, including on their own
initiative (Article 376.4). The second subcriterion refers to interaction between the
domestic mechanism and its own government. This is the case in the EU-Peru-
Colombia (Article 281), EU-Ecuador (Article 281), EU-Singapore (Article
13.15.5), EU-Canada (Article 23.8.4), and EU-Vietnam (Article 15.4) agreements
where the domestic mechanisms may, ‘on their own initiative’, submit views or
recommendations to their respective Parties on the implementation of the sustain-
able development chapter. The third subcriterion highlights interaction between
the transnational mechanism and the Parties. This interaction is, for example, explicitly
included in the case of the EU-Georgia agreement, where ‘the Parties shall present
an update on the implementation of this Chapter to the joint civil society dialogue
forum’ (Article 241.3) and the views and the opinions of the joint civil society
dialogue forum ‘shall be submitted to the Parties’ (ibid.). The fourth subcriterion
reflects the interaction between the transnational mechanism and the Parties by means of
the domestic mechanism. This possibility is only foreseen in the cases of the EU-
Korea, EU-Ukraine, and EU-Canada agreements.
The above-mentioned interaction between civil society and the government
(s) can take place at different levels, ranging from one-way communication (e.g.
the EU-Moldova agreement where the domestic mechanisms ‘may submit views
or recommendations on the implementation of this Chapter, including on its
A CSI INDEX 49
(their) own initiative’ (Article 376.4)) to two-way communication in which civil
society and governments are obliged to react to each other’s communications. This
is the case for the EU-Canada agreement (see infra). This gradation was also taken
into account while scoring the different provisions.
2.5 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
A fifth and final cluster reflects the involvement of civil society in the settlement of
disputes between the Parties.25 CSI in these mechanisms creates more opportunities
for civil society organizations to provide input and enforce the commitments made
in the sustainable development chapter. We can identify six criteria. A first
criterion concerns whether communications of the domestic mechanism can form the
basis of government consultations. This is only the case for the EU-Korea agreement
(Article 13.14.1). CSI is rated higher when this possibility is explicitly mentioned.
A second criterion concerns the involvement of the domestic mechanism in government
consultations. In the EU-Georgia (Article 242.5) and EU-Moldova (Article 378.5)
agreements, it is mentioned that ‘where appropriate, that Sub-Committee may
seek the advice of the DAG(s) [domestic mechanism(s)] of either or both Party(ies)
or other expert assistance’. CSI is rated higher when a domestic mechanism can
take the initiative to provide input to the consultations. A third criterion concerns
the advisory role of the domestic mechanism to the Panel of Experts during its proceedings.
This role is again explicit in the EU-Korea agreement (Article 13.15.1) as well as in
the EU-Ukraine agreement (Article 301.1). CSI is rated higher when the Panel of
Experts is expected to seek its advice than when this possibility is not foreseen. A
fourth criterion concerns whether the Panel of Experts informs the domestic mechanism
about the outcome of its proceedings. This is the case both in the EU-Korea (Article
13.15.2) and EU-Ukraine (Article 301.2) agreements. In the case where it is
mentioned that the outcome of the Panel of Experts report shall be made available
to the domestic mechanism, CSI is rated higher, since the civil society are kept
abreast and as such involved. A fifth criterion refers to the governments informing the
domestic mechanism about the implementation of the report drawn up by the Panel of
Experts. CSI is scored higher when both the responding and requesting govern-
ments are required to inform their domestic mechanism. This is, for example, the
case in the EU-Canada (Article 23.10.12) and EU-Singapore (Article 13.17.9)
agreement. A sixth criterion determines the involvement of the civil society
25 In EU trade agreements, the sustainable development chapters are excluded from the general dispute
settlement system of the trade agreement as a whole. When a violation of labour or environmental
provisions arises, the issue can be discussed in government consultations. As a last resort, a panel of
experts can be established. However, no sanction is foreseen if the panel’s recommendations are not
followed up.
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mechanisms in monitoring the implementation of the report drawn up by the Panel of
Experts. In the EU-Georgia agreement this possibility is explicitly mentioned
while it is not the case in, for instance, the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement. CSI
is rated higher when civil society may submit observations in this regard.
3 SIGNIFICANT VARIATION: OUTCOME AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
Table 1 presents the scores on the different criteria and clusters, based on the
codebook that was developed for this purpose. This mapping exercise shows a
strong variation between the different EU trade agreements. Overall (see ‘Total’ in
Table 1), some agreements score much higher on the CSI Index than others. In
addition, there is variation within and between different clusters. Some agreements
have a similar score on the overall CSI Index while featuring significantly different
scores on separate clusters and criteria, respectively.
This section provides a more general picture of the broad variation found and
elaborates on the substantial differences between the CSI provisions. It is structured
around the overall scores of the CSI Index. Therefore a distinction between three
groups is made. First, the EU-Canada and EU-Korea agreements belong to the
group with the highest score. This can mainly be attributed to their emphasis on
participants’ independence, membership scope, and most of all dispute settlement.
Second, the EU-Georgia, EU-Moldova, EU-Vietnam, and EU-Ukraine agree-
ments constitute the intermediate group. All of them score relatively high on the
criteria referring to membership scope, transnational meeting, and interaction
between civil society and the Parties. Third, the EU-Central America, EU-
Singapore, EU-Peru-Colombia, and EU-Ecuador agreements constitute the
group with the lowest scores on each cluster.
3.1 HIGH CSI
In the first group, the EU-Canada agreement scores comparatively high.
Concerning the membership scope, it is the only agreement that creates separate
domestic groups for labour and environmental issues. Another unique provision is
the obligation of the governments to follow up annually on the communications
from the transnational civil society meetings: ‘any view or opinion of the Civil
Society Forum shall be presented to the Parties directly, or through the consulta-
tive mechanisms (…) The Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development
shall report annually on the follow-up to those communications (Art. 22.4.4(b))’.
This obligatory two-way communication results in a remarkably high score for the
criterion on interaction with the Parties. The EU-Canada trade agreement also
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scores high on the dispute settlement cluster where the domestic group can give
advice to the government consultation and is involved in the monitoring of the
implementation of the report of Panel of Experts.
The EU-Korea trade agreement was the first EU agreement creating civil
society mechanisms. It also scores high, however with a different emphasis on
certain criteria than the agreement with Canada: the determining clusters here
concern the scope of membership and dispute settlement. First, the EU-Korea
trade agreement is the only agreement establishing new domestic groups for the
specific purpose of this agreement. Contrary to the other agreements, it is not
stipulated that existing groups can be consulted for this purpose. Moreover, it is the
only agreement where the closed transnational meeting comprises only the mem-
bers of each domestic group and not additional members. In addition, this transna-
tional mechanism does not depend on the Parties to convene these meetings and
can determine its own meeting frequency. This strong independence is a rare
provision, only shared with the EU-Ukraine agreement.
Second, in the EU-Korea trade agreement the domestic groups can play a
more important role in providing input for the dispute settlement mechanisms.
This is different from the EU-Canada agreement where civil society can play a role
in the follow-up of these mechanisms. It should also be noted that this agreement
scores remarkably low on interaction with the Parties. Contrary to the EU-Canada
agreement, no interaction is foreseen between the domestic group and the Parties,
and the provision describing the interaction between the transnational meeting and
the Parties is much weaker: ‘The Parties can present an update on the implemen-
tation of this Chapter to the Civil Society Forum. The views, opinions or findings
of the Civil Society Forum can be submitted to the Parties directly or through the
Domestic Advisory Group(s)’ (Art. 13.12.3)’.
3.2 MEDIUM CSI
In the intermediate group, the CSI Index scores are close to each other. The civil
society provisions in the EU-Georgia and EU-Moldova agreements are identical.26
Interestingly, however, there are significant differences between the scores on the
clusters and criteria of these agreements and the EU-Vietnam and EU-Ukraine
agreements.
For some criteria, the EU-Georgia, EU-Moldova, and EU-Vietnam agree-
ments display strong resemblances. For instance, the three agreements score rela-
tively high on interaction with the Parties. First, two-way communication is
26 An interesting difference with the other agreements is the explicit reference to civil society organiza-
tions established in their ‘own territories’.
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created by the obligation of the governments to report on the implementation of
the sustainable development chapter during the transnational meetings together
with the submission of the report (EU-Vietnam) and views and opinions (EU-
Georgia and EU-Moldova) of these transnational meetings to the Parties. Second,
the possibility is created for the domestic mechanisms to communicate their views
and recommendations to their own government (specified in the EU-Vietnam
agreement) or potentially to both governments through the intergovernmental
body as it is not specified in the EU-Georgia and EU-Moldova trade agreements.
This explicit reference to ‘its respective party’ in the EU-Vietnam trade agreement
(Article 15.4) is a notable difference. In addition, the criteria on civil society
interaction with the dispute settlement mechanism are exactly the same in all
three agreements. Here, the domestic mechanisms may give their advice during
government consultations, and they are informed about and may submit, together
with the transnational mechanism, observations on the implementation of the
report of the Panel of Experts. These agreements do not score as high as the
EU-Korea or EU-Canada agreements because the provisions referring to the
consultation of the domestic groups to receive input for the dispute settlement
mechanisms remain more voluntary.
However, the EU-Vietnam trade agreement scores differently on several other
criteria and shows some peculiarities. On the one hand, it scores very high on the
membership score of the transnational meetings as it involves both the domestic
groups and other stakeholders. This is unique compared to all the other agree-
ments. On the other hand, it scores low on other criteria. As indicated in the
previous section, the agreement only refers to ‘stakeholders’ and never to ‘civil
society’ (similar to the EU-Singapore agreement). In addition, the selection of the
members of the domestic groups is determined by domestic procedures (as with
the EU-Peru-Colombia and EU-Ecuador agreements).
Interestingly, the EU-Ukraine agreement differs from the others in the
intermediate category, including the agreements with the other Eastern
Partnership countries Georgia and Moldova. The following provisions are
noteworthy. First, regarding the transnational meeting, and similarly to the
EU-Korea trade agreement, this meeting in the EU-Ukraine agreement is
more ambitious since it does not depend on the Parties to be convened.
Second, even though the EU-Ukraine agreement scores similar to the others
on civil society interaction, a closer look at the criteria reveals significant
differences. For instance, the EU-Ukraine agreement foresees the possibility
for the domestic group to function as an intermediary for communications of
the transnational meeting. The latter is a provision only shared with the EU-
Korea and EU-Canada agreements, and is the only communication channel
created for interaction between civil society organizations in the domestic
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groups and transnational meetings. Third, the EU-Ukraine agreement scores
particularly low on dispute settlement, where it does not involve civil society
in the government consultation and the follow-up of the Panel of Expert
report.
3.3 LOW CSI
The third group consists of the EU-Central America, EU-Singapore, EU-Peru-
Colombia, and EU-Ecuador trade agreements. These agreements score low on all
clusters. For instance, they all score very low on scope of membership and
operation of the transnational meeting, and extremely low on the cluster on
dispute settlement. However, there are noteworthy peculiarities and differences,
which will be discussed here.
There are two particularities that are unique to the EU-Central America
agreement. First, there is a provision creating the opportunity to enforce existing
bodies should they be consulted as domestic groups; this positively influences the
CSI score. Second, there is a possibility to involve state actors, namely ‘local public
authorities’; this negatively influences the CSI score.
Even though the EU-Singapore agreement has the same overall score as the
EU agreement with Central America, it differs from the other agreements in this
group on certain criteria. First, the EU-Singapore agreement contains, albeit weak,
CSI provisions in the dispute settlement mechanism. This is contrary to the EU-
Central America and EU-Colombia-Peru agreements, which do not refer at all to
CSI in dispute settlement. Second, the EU-Singapore, EU-Peru-Colombia, and
EU-Ecuador agreements score lower than the EU-Central America agreement on
the interaction between the transnational meetings and the Parties; however, the
three agreements level this by mentioning the possibility for the domestic group to
submit views or recommendations to their respective Parties. Third, the EU-
Singapore agreement only refers to ‘stakeholders’ and never to ‘civil society’.
Fourth, it also scores the lowest of all the agreements on the operation of the
transnational meetings. In this context, the agreement does not mention a deadline
by when the Parties should agree on the operation of the transnational meeting.
This provision is included in all agreements except for the EU-Singapore and EU-
Central America agreements. In addition, and contrary to all other agreements, the
EU-Singapore agreement does not explicitly foresee an annual transnational meet-
ing. The organization of these meetings depends entirely on whether a meeting of
the intergovernmental body takes place, which is not guaranteed as it ‘shall meet
during the first two years after the agreement enters into force and thereafter as
necessary’ (Article 13.15.3). This explains the low score on the criteria ‘reoccur-
rence’ and ‘dependence to intergovernmental body’.
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The EU agreements with Peru-Colombia and Ecuador score lowest on the
CSI Index for a number of reasons. First, in contrast to all other agreements, there
is no mention of the need for the members of the domestic groups to be
‘independent’. Second, their selection should be ‘in accordance with domestic
law’, thus depending on domestic procedures as is the case in the EU-Vietnam
trade agreement. Third, the transnational meeting constitutes a ‘session with the
public at large’ where the members of the domestic group ‘are allowed to
participate’, resulting in a very vague description of the required participants,
which is much weaker than in most other agreements.
In sum, we have shown that there is considerable variation between CSI in EU
trade agreements. The CSI Index makes it possible to distinguish three categories of
trade agreements: those with a high, medium, and low level of CSI. In addition, we
identified more subtle variations between agreements within the same category, and
a number of particularities that make ‘high CSI’ trade agreements score lower on
some criteria and ‘low CSI’ agreements score higher on specific criteria. We have
thus largely confirmed that there is a significant degree of flexibility within the
general template of CSI in the sustainable development chapter.
4 CONCLUSION
This article aimed to shed light on a new phenomenon in the most recent
generation of EU trade agreements, namely the involvement of civils society in
the sustainable development chapter. Drawing on an innovative CSI Index con-
sisting of twenty-one criteria in five different clusters (i.e. participants’ indepen-
dence from governments, scope of membership, operation of transnational
mechanism, interaction, and dispute settlement mechanism), it allowed comparison
of different degrees of CSI in ten EU agreements concluded with sixteen coun-
tries. This detailed mapping revealed a remarkable degree of variation in the extent
to which civil society organizations can be involved. We found that, notwith-
standing the fact that a common template is used, there appears to be crucial
variation between agreements. We identified three categories of agreements (high,
medium, and low CSI) and analysed relevant differences between and within these
categories.
With this study we aimed to provide a nuanced picture of how EU trade
agreements exhibit CSI. We can thus increase our knowledge on the role of civil
society in EU trade agreements beyond ex ante involvement of interest groups, that
is during EU trade agreement negotiations,27 and beyond ex post learning and
27 A. Dür & D. De Bièvre, Inclusion Without Influence? NGOs in European Trade Policy, 27 J. Pub. Pol’y
(2007).
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dialogues of civil society actors after the EU-Korea trade agreement,28 inaugurat-
ing a new generation of CSI. The study also emphasizes that transnational civil
society engagement in trade agreements is not limited to the North American
context29 but has also evolved in recent years in the EU approach. Even more,
while CSI on labour-related issues in US trade agreements is normally linked to
public complaints and, if deemed appropriate by decision makers, to state-actor
meetings,30 the EU has pioneered a promising multifaceted approach for CSI
which in the best case allows for regular, independent, and transparent interactions
on trade-related issues of interest to a broader public.
Now that the CSI provisions in EU trade agreements have been meticulously
mapped and their variation thoroughly analysed, the stage is set for further research
on the explanations for this large variation. These could relate, for example, to
institutional EU path dependency, leading to an incremental CSI ambition; trade
power asymmetries, where the strongest partner can impose its will; the level of
sustainable development in the trade partners, where the trade partner with the
lowest level of sustainable development strives for a low level of CSI; EU compe-
titiveness interests, where the EU aims to reduce or eliminate the trade partners’
comparative advantages by increasing their sustainable development standards;
existing civil society participation, where high civil society participation in the
trade partners is reflected in high CSI in the trade agreement; and finally the trade
partners’ negotiation skills and capacity. This knowledge would lead to a better
understanding of the conducive and hindering conditions for CSI, which will be
relevant even beyond the scope of CSI in EU trade agreements.
In addition to the explanations for CSI variation, our findings invite further
research on the implications for the implementation of the CSI provisions. While
we could show that CSI varies considerably between EU agreements, there is still
uncertainty to what extent higher CSI in agreements also leads to higher CSI in
practice. To be sure, the more precise the requirements are in a trade agreement,
the more legal inducement exists to actually involve civil society actors. To
illustrate, due to a lack of specific requirements, the transnational mechanism of
the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the so-called
Consultative Committee, was only inaugurated six years after the EPA had been
signed.31 Moreover, a recent study on Peru’s compliance with the sustainable
development chapter of the EU-Peru-Colombia agreement indicated how on
eight different criteria the low level of commitment in the treaty had already had
28 Postnikov & Bastiaens, supra n. 5.
29 T. Kay, NAFTA and the Politics of Labor Transnationalism (Cambridge University Press 2011).
30 M. Oehri, US and EU Labor Governance in the Dominican Republic: Contrasting the DR-CAFTA and the
CARIFORUM-EPA De Jure and De Facto, 89 Bull. Comp. Lab. Rel. (2015).
31 Oehri, supra n. 5 and n. 30.
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consequences in policy practice, including the domestic mechanisms’ little or no
independence and the use of existing but not effectively functioning advisory
groups.32 And yet, while relevant articles in EU trade agreements set a starting
point for CSI, procedural guidelines on the actual functioning of CSI mechanisms
are normally agreed upon during the inauguration of these mechanisms.
Accordingly, further research should look into the actual functioning and effec-
tiveness of CSI in EU trade agreements.
ANNEX: CODEBOOK CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT INDEX
A. Independence participants:
i. Term:
stakeholder: 0
civil society mentioned once: 1
civil society mentioned more than once: 2
ii. Independence mentioned:
not mentioned: 0
mentioned: 1
iii. Selection domestic mechanism:
explicit mention of domestic procedures: 0
no mention of domestic procedures: 1
B. Scope membership:
i. specificity domestic mechanism:
labour, environment, sustainable development: 0
other groups (e.g. workers’ organizations) explicitly mentioned: 1
separate domestic mechanisms for labour & environmental issues: 2
ii. Novelty:
new or existing: 0
new or existing with comment to reinforce existing groups: 1
new: 2
iii. Transnational:
public at large: 0
list relevant organizations: 1
include members domestic mechanism, open: 2
include members domestic mechanism, closed: 3
32 J. Orbie & L. Van den Putte, Labour Rights in Peru and the EU Ttrade Agreement: Compliance with the
Commitments Under the Sustainable Development Chapter, ÖFSE Working Paper Series (Austrian
Foundation for Development Research 2016).
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include domestic mechanism as a whole, open: 4
iv. Presence state actor:
yes: 0
not mentioned: 1
C. Operation transnational meeting:
i. Deadline for Parties
no: 0
yes: 1
ii. Reoccurrence:
‘as necessary’: 0
once a year, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties: 1
iii. Independence from the intergovernmental body for organization:
no: 0
yes: 1
D. Interaction:
i. Among domestic and transnational mechanisms:
no communication: 0
one way communication (domestic to transnational or vice versa): 1
ii. Civil society mechanisms and governmental actors:
a. Domestic mechanism & Parties
b. Domestic mechanism & own government
c. Transnational & governmental actors (Parties/intergovernmental
body)
d. Domestic mechanism as intermediate for transnational
no communication: 0
one-way communication (X to Y or Y to X) can/may: 1
one-way communication (X to Y or Y to X) shall/will: 2
exchange of views or conduct a dialogue: 3
two-way communication (X <-> Y) can/may: 4
two-way communication (X <-> Y) shall/will: 5
follow-up: X reacts to communication Y: shall/will: 6
E. Dispute Settlement mechanism:
i. Domestic mechanism communication basis for initiating Government
Consultations
no: 0
may/can: 1
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ii. Government consultation/Committee asks advice from domestic
mechanism (during proceedings):
no: 0
may/can: 1
will/shall/should: 2
own initiative DAG: 3
iii. Panel of Experts asks advice from domestic mechanism (during
proceedings):
no: 0
may/can: 1
will/shall/should: 2
iv. Panel of Experts informs domestic mechanism about outcome:
no: 0
may/can: 1
will/shall/should: 2
v. Parties inform domestic mechanism about implementation Panel of
Experts’ report :
no: 0
responding Party shall inform: 1
responding and requesting Party shall inform: 2
vi. Civil society mechanisms involvement in monitoring of implementa-
tion Panel of Experts’ report:
no: 0
stakeholders may submit observations: 1
domestic mechanism may submit observations: 2
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